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TAX BREAKS FOR LAW STUDENTS
Another man conceives the notion that he will be able to practice his
vocation with greater ease and profit if he has an opportunity to enrich
his culture. Forthwith the price of his education becomes an expense of
the business, reducing the income subject to taxation.)
-Mr. Justice Cardozo
Justice Cardozo's "other" man is one who repays stolen money to
clear the family name and then deducts the payments as ordinary busi-
ness expenses.2 Although the repayment of money stolen by another ap-
parently remains nondeductible,' Justice Cardozo probably would be
surprised to learn that some of the costs of a legal education may qualify
as business expenses that reduce taxable income.' The purpose of this
article is to provide a practical guide to the law of federal income taxa-
tion as it affects law students.'
Section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) imposes a tax on the
taxable income of every individual.' The tax rate increases progressively
in proportion to the amount of taxable income.7 The conscientious tax-
payer, therefore, seeks to reduce his tax burden by reducing his taxable
income An individual's taxable income is his adjusted gross income
' Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933).
2 Id.
' See generally Luther Wallin, 32 B.T.A. 697 (1935); San-Knit-Ary Textile Mills, Inc.,
22 B.T.A. 754 (1931). But cf Spitz v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D. Wis. 1977)
(restitution payment by employee after his conviction for theft deductible).
4 In Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), Justice Cardozo declared that holding the
payment of another's debts to be an ordinary and necessary business expense would open
the door to many "bizarre" analogies, including an analogy to educational costs. Id at 115.
Even if educational costs are analogous to payments for another's debts, educational costs
are deductible under some circumstances. See text accompanying notes 37-62 infra.
- All statutory references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 unless otherwise
stated.
, I.R.C. § 1. Section 1 addresses four categories of individual taxpayers: married indi-
viduals filing joint returns and surviving spouses, heads of households, unmarried individ-
uals, and married individuals filing separate returns. Id § l(a)-(d).
The constitutional basis for the federal government's taxing power is the sixteenth
amendment. The sixteenth amendment empowers Congress to lay and collect taxes on in-
comes, from whatever source derived. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
' See I.R.C. § 1. All individuals of the same taxpayer status are taxed at the same rate
on equivalent amounts of taxable income. For example, § 1(c) imposes upon an unmarried in-
dividual with a taxable income of more than $6,500, but not more than $8,500, a tax of $692
plus 19% of the excess over $6,500. An unmarried individual with a taxable income of more
than $8,500, but not more than $10,800, is subject to a tax of $692 plus 19% of $2,000, or
$1,072, plus 21% of the excess over $8,500. Id. § 1(c).
' Although tax evasion constitutes a felony, see I.R.C. § 7201, tax avoidance is per-
fectly acceptable. Lecture by Professor James William H. Stewart at Washington and Lee
University (Aug. 22, 1979); see Jones v. Grinnell, 179 F.2d 873, 874 (10th Cir. 1950); [1980 1
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 637.13. See also Matthew 22:15-22.
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minus the sum of his excess itemized deductions and personal exemp-
tions.9 Adjusted gross income is an individual's gross income ° less cer-
tain deductions specified within section 62.11 Itemized deductions are
allowable deductions other than personal exemptions and other than
those used to calculate adjusted gross income. 12 Excess itemized deduc-
tions are those itemized deductions in excess of the zero bracket
amount. 3 Personal exemptions are ordinarily $1,000 per person. 4
The section 62 deductions often are referred to as above-the-line
deductions because they are utilized in deriving adjusted gross income. 15
With adjusted gross income marking the "line," itemized deductions are
called below-the-line deductions because the taxpayer can subtract them
after he has determined his adjusted gross income."6 Itemized deductions
are helpful to a taxpayer, however, only if they exceed the zero bracket
amount 7 because a taxpayer may subtract only the excess from his ad-
justed gross income to reduce his taxable income.18 Above-the-line deduc-
tions are not limited by any threshold requirement.19 Every above-the-
line deduction reduces a taxpayer's adjusted gross income, which in turn
reduces his taxable income. 21 For law students, moving expenses and cer-
I.R.C. § 63(b); see note 13 infra.
" Except as otherwise provided in Subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code, see I.R.C.
§§ 101-128, gross income is all income from whatever source derived. Id. § 61(a).
" See id. § 62.
IId- § 63(f). The taxpayer may not take deductions for personal, living, or family ex-
penses, except as the Code otherwise provides. Id. § 262. Difficulties in determining the
deductibility of particular expenses usually stem from a conflict between a particular provi-
sion of the Code and § 262.
11 Id § 63(c). The zero bracket amount is $3,400 on a tax return filed jointly by spouses,
and $2,300 on the return of an unmarried individual. Id § 63(d). Section 63(b) requires some
individuals to include all or part of the zero bracket amount in their taxable income. For ex-
ample, an unmarried individual who has earned income of less than $2,300 and whose
parents claim him as a dependent must increase his taxable income by the lesser of $2,300
minus his earned income or $2,300 minus his itemized deductions. See id § 63(b) & (e).
" See id. § 151(b). On a joint return, § 151(b) entitles both the husband and wife to per-
sonal exemptions of $1,000 each. If a couple does not file a joint return, the taxpayer may
take an additional $1,000 personal exemption deduction for his spouse, provided the spouse
has no gross income and is not the dependent of another taxpayer. Id The Code also author-
izes additional exemptions for the elderly, blindness, and dependents. See id. § 151(c)-(e). A
taxpayer may claim an exemption for himself even if his parents claim him as a dependent.
See id. § 151(b); [1980] 1 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1242.043.
's See I.R.C. § 62.
" See id. § 63(b).
'7 See note 13 supra.
See I.R.C. § 63(b)-(c). A couple filing a joint return must itemize deductions amount-
ing to more than $3,400 to benefit from the itemization of deductions; a single taxpayer
must itemize more than $2,300 to. benefit. See id § 63c)-(d). The zero bracket amount con-
cept of § 63(d) has replaced the earlier standard deduction provision. The current Code
effectively incorporates the standard deduction in the tax rate scales of § 1.
" See id. § 62.
See id. §§ 62, 63(b).
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tain other job-related costs may constitute valuable above-the-line
deductions.2
MOVING EXPENSES
One of the first expenses a law student may incur is the cost of mov-
ing to the law school location. Moving expenses are above-the-line deduc-
tions under section 217 of the Code if the law student incurs them in
connection with the commencement of work at a new principal place of
employment.22 The taxpayer must meet two conditions in order to claim
a moving expense deduction.' First, the taxpayer's new principal place
of work must be a certain distance from his former residence., Second,
the taxpayer must work as a full-time employee or as a self-employed in-
dividual for a specified length of time following his arrival at his new
location. '
Section 217 does not benefit most law students at the start of law
school because students ordinarily are not employed full-time while at-
tending law school.26 Nevertheless, the spouse of a married law student
may be able to satisfy section 217 requirementsY If a couple's move ful-
2, See id. § 62(1), (2), (8). See also text accompanying notes 22, 62, 105 infra.
' I.R.C. §§ 217(a), 62(8). An individual's principal place of employment normally is the
place where he spends most of his working time. Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(c)(3) (1979).
' See I.R.C. § 217(c).
24 See id. § 217(c)(1). The distance from the taxpayer's new principal place of work to
his former residence must be at least 35 miles greater than the distance from his former
place of work to his former residence. Id. If, for example, the taxpayer's former place of
work was 15 miles from his former residence, § 217 requires that the taxpayer's new place
of work be at least 50 miles from his former residence in order for his moving expenses to
be deductible. See id. See also Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(a)(3), (c)(2) (1979). If the taxpayer had no
former place of work, the distance from his new place of work must be at least 35 miles from
his former residence. I.R.C. § 217(c)(1)(B).
' See I.R.C. § 217(c)(2). To deduct moving expenses, the taxpayer must work as a full-
time employee for at least 39 weeks of the 12-month period immediately following his ar-
rival at his new location. Id- § 217(c)(2)(A). If the taxpayer is self-employed, he must work on
a full-time basis for at least 78 weeks of the 24-month period immediately following his ar-
rival. Id. § 217(c)(2)(B). Thirty-nine of those 78 work weeks must be during the first 12
months. Id. If the taxpayer cannot satisfy the § 217 time requirement by reason of death,
disability, or involuntary separation from his job, the employment condition is waived. Id. §
217(d)(1). If the taxpayer is unable to satisfy the employment condition for other reasons, he
must include the amount previously deducted in his current gross income or file an amended
return. See id. § 217(d)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(d)(3) (1979).
According to Alvin L. Goldman, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 574, aff'd, 497 F.2d 382 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974), a taxpayer may not maintain the inconsistent posi-
tions that he has moved for § 217 purposes and that he is stationed only temporarily for §
162(a)(2) purposes. Id. at 577; see Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(c)(3)(iii) (1979); text accompanying
notes 80-90 infra.
26 Attending law school is not a full-time job for tax purposes. See Benjamin Taylor,
Jr., 71 T.C. 124, 128 (1978). See generally I.R.C. §§ 217(f)(1), 3121(d).
, Direct expenses, see text accompanying note 29 infra, and costs of residence sale,
purchase, or lease arrangements are deductible whether or not the spouse has secured
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fills the distance condition, and if the spouse is employed for an appropri-
ate time period, the spouse may deduct all direct and a limited amount of
indirect moving expenses.' Direct expenses include the reasonable costs
of moving household goods and costs of transportation, meals, and lodg-
ing for the family during the actual move.' Deductible indirect expenses
include the reasonable costs of temporary quarters,"0 searching for a new
residence," and certain residence sale, purchase, or lease transactions.
32
employment prior to the move. See I.R.C. § 217(b)(1)(A), (B), (E); Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(a)(3)
(1979). Costs attributable to temporary quarters and residence-hunting, see text accompany-
ing notes 30 & 31 infra, are deductible only if the spouse obtained his or her job prior to the
move. See I.R.C. § 217(b)(1)(C), (D); Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(a)(3) (1979). In order for any moving
expenses to be deductible, the spouse must commence work within one year of the couple's
move. See Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(a)(3) (1979).
1 See notes 29-32 infra. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(b) (1979). If the law stu-
dent and his spouse file a joint return, the student also benefits from the moving expense
deduction. See Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(c)(4)(v) (1979).
, See I.R.C. § 217(b)(1)(A), (B). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(b)(2)-(4), (10) (1979). For a
specific list of deductible moving expenses, see English & Jackson, Moving Expenses Due
to a Change of Job Location May Qualify For Moving Expense Deduction, 19 TAx. Ac-
COUNTANTS 370, 372-73 (1977) [hereinafter cited as English & Jackson]. Direct moving ex-
penses are not subject to any dollar limitation. See I.R.C. § 217(b)(3).
"' See I.R.C. § 217(b)(1l(D). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(b)(6) (1979). The costs of meals
and lodging are deductible while the taxpayer and his family occupy temporary quarters
during any period of 30 consecutive days after he has obtained employment. I.R.C. §
217(b)(1)(D), (3)(C).
", See I.R.C. § 217(b)(1)(C). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(b)(5) (1979). The taxpayer may
deduct the costs of residence-hunting trips only if he obtained employment prior to the
trips. See I.R.C. § 217(b)(1)(C). Deductible residence-hunting expenses include the costs of
meals and lodging. Id.
' See I.R.C. § 217(b)(1)(E). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(b)(7) (1979). The sale and pur-
chase expenses of a residence are deductible if the expenses are reasonable and incident to
the sale of the former residence or the purchase of the new residence. These expenses in-
clude the expenditures that the taxpayer would take into account in determining the
amount realized on his former residence, such as sales commission, and the adjusted basis
on his new residence, such as the cost of a loan. I.R.C. § 217(b)(2)(A), (B). Deductible lease ex-
penses include those costs incident to the settlement of an unexpired lease or the acquisi-
tion of a new lease. Id. § 217(b)(2}(C), (D).
Although direct expense deductions, see text accompanying note 29 supra, are not sub-
ject to a dollar limitation, the deduction for indirect expenses is subject to an upper limit of
$3,000. See I.R.C. § 217(b)(3). No more than $1,500 of that $3,000 may consist of expenses at-
tributable to residence-hunting trips or the occupation of temporary quarters. See id.; notes
30 & 31 supra. Assume, for example, that a taxpayer incurs $700 in direct expenses and
$3,500 in indirect expenses, $1600 of which is attributable to a residence-hunting trip and
temporary living quarters, and $1900 of which is attributable to residence sale and pur-
chase. The taxpayer may deduct the total $700 in direct expenses. He may deduct, however,
only $1500 of the indirect expenses attributable to residence-hunting and temporary
quarters. The taxpayer may deduct an additional $1500 for residence sale and purchase. The
taxpayer, therefore, is precluded from deducting $500 worth of indirect expenses. Never-
theless, the taxpayer may capitalize the remaining $400 in indirect expenses attributable to
sale and purchase. See English & Jackson, supra note 29, at 372. Capitalization of the excess
sale and purchase expenses either reduces the amount realized on the former residence or
increases the adjusted basis of the new residence. See id.
19811
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Single and married law students may be able to deduct the expense
of moving to a permanent place of employment upon graduation.- The
move must satisfy the same distance and time conditions,34 and the same
dollar limitations apply.35 If the student's employer reimburses the stu-
dent for any moving expenses, the student must include the amounts
reimbursed in his gross income."
EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES
Upon a student's arrival at law school, and throughout his legal
career, a law student faces a substantial number of unavoidable expenses.
Tuition and books, bar review courses and bar exam fees, journals, and
seminars are very costly. Naturally, law students and attorneys seek to
deduct these educational expenses. Although the courts have not always
agreed with the taxpayers' interpretations of the Code, 7 judges have
afforded students and attorneys a number of significant tax breaks for
educational costs.8
Section 162 is central to the deductibility of educational expenses.
Section 162 allows a deduction for all the "ordinary and necessary" ex-
penses paid or incurred in carrying on any trade or business. 9 Ordinary
expenses are those expenses that are not uncommon."0 Expenses are
necessary if they are appropriate or helpful. 1 A law student's educa-
tional costs are deductible only if the student is carrying on a trade or
business for which his educational costs are ordinary and necessary.
Moving expenses are deductible only for the year in which they are paid. See Della
M. Meadows, 66 T.C. 51, 53 (1976); I.R.C. § 217(a). Therefore, the taxpayer must deduct
residence-hunting expenses paid in the year prior to graduation from the gross income of
the prior year. See generally id. §§ 62(8), 217(a), (b)(1)(C). If a law student has accepted an
offer of employment, he may deduct indirect expenses of residence-hunting and temporary
living quarters incurred subsequent to his acceptance. See id. § 217(b}(1)(C), (D).
See notes 24 & 25 supra.
See note 32 supra.
I.R.C. § 82; see id. § 61.
See text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
The judiciary first approved the deductibility of educational costs in Hill v. Commis-
sioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950). See Niswander, Tax Aspects of Education: When Ordi-
nary and Necessary; When Personal, 26 N.Y.U. INST. FED. TAX. 27, 27 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as Niswander]. In Hill, an established teacher attended summer school in order to
fulfill current state certification requirements. 181 F.2d at 908. Although the taxpayer had
the option of reading five books and submitting to examination on their content, the Fourth
Circuit ruled that the taxpayer's summer costs were ordinary and necessary expenses and
thus deductible. Id. at 911. The Hill court reasoned that the statutory requirements were
satisfied because the teacher's choice was normal and natural for a reasonable person. Id. at
908. The court recognized that the taxpayer incurred the summer expenses to maintain her
present position, not to attain a new one. Id at 909.
I.R.C. § 162(a).
See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933). Although ordinary expenses are
those expenses which are not uncommon, expenses need not be incurred often in order to be
ordinary. Id- See also Deputy v. DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940).
41 See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
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Treasury Regulation 1.162-5 outlines the specific requirements that
the taxpayer must meet in order to deduct his educational expenses
under section 162.42 As a general rule, educational costs are deductible in
two contexts. If the education maintains or improves skills required by
the taxpayer in his employment or other trade or business, the costs are
deductible. The taxpayer may also deduct educational expenses if the
applicable law or regulations or the taxpayer's employer requires the
education as a condition of continued employment." The deductibility of
educational costs is subject, however, to two further stipulations. First,
educational costs are not deductible if the education satisfies the mini-
mum educational requirements for qualification in the taxpayer's trade
or business. 5 Second, the costs of education that qualifies the taxpayer
for a new trade or business are not deductible."6
Degree Expenses
Attempts by J.D. degree candidates to deduct their educational ex-
penses have been uniformly unsuccessful. In denying the deduction for
educational costs, the courts stress that the law students are qualifying
for a new trade or business."8 Since a law degree is essential to qualifica-
tion for the trade or business of the practice of law, a law student does
not incur his educational expenses in the "carrying on" of a trade or busi-
ness pursuant to section 162.11
" Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1967). Regulation 1.162-5 codifies the decisions in Hill v. Com-
missioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950), and Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.
1953). See note 38 supra; text accompanying notes 58-61 infra.
', Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(1) (1967). Vocational courses or seminars on current develop-
ments may be educational because these courses maintain or improve employment skills.
See id. § 1.162-5(c)(1). Skills are required for the taxpayer's employment when the skills are
appropriate, helpful, or necessary. See Niswander, supra note 38, at 37.
" Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(a)(2) (1967). See also id. § 1.162-5(c)(2).
45 Id. § 1.162-5(b)(2).
" Id. § 1.162-5(b)(3). Costs for educational courses that meet the minimum educational
requirements for qualification in the taxpayer's trade or business, or that qualify the tax-
payer for a new trade or business, are either personal expenditures or an inseparable com-
bination of personal and capital expenditures. Id. § 1.162-5(b)(1).
' See, e.g., Orrin Grover, 68 T.C. 598, 602 (1977); Albert C. Ruehmann, III, 30 T.C.M.
(CCH) 675, 679 (1971). See also Joel A. Sharon, 66 T.C. 515, 525-26 (1976), affd per curiam,
591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); note 49 infra. The efforts of
J.D. degree candidates to deduct educational costs will continue to be unsuccessful in the
future. One commentator has noted that law school expenses are always nondeductible
because the education qualifies the taxpayer for a new trade or business. See Barr, Not All
Professional Education Expenses Are Deductible: Analysis of Current Tests, 16 TAX. Ac-
COUNTANTS 154, 155 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Barr]. But see note 48 infra.
" See Melnik v. United States, 521 F.2d 1065, 1065 (1975); Barr, supra note 47, at 155.
One commentator has suggested that the I.R.S. should allow a deduction for law school ex-
penses if the taxpayer seeks only to increase his effectiveness in his present trade or busi-
ness and has no intention of practicing law. See Niswander, supra note 38, at 41.
," The "carrying on" language of § 162 is crucial for determining whether trade or
business expenses are deductible. See I.R.C. § 162(a). In Albert C. Ruehmann, II, 30 T.C.M.
1981]
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Other graduate degree candidates have been more successful at
deducting their educational costs under section 162.1' In order to deduct
his educational expenses, the degree candidate must be actively engaged
in the trade or business to which his studies pertain before he enters the
graduate program. 1 An LL.M. degree candidate, therefore, must estab-
lish that he was carrying on the practice of law prior to, the start of his
graduate law studies. 2 The LL.M. degree candidate may be able to
(CCH) 675 (1971), a law student sought to deduct his educational expenses for the spring
semester of his third year. Id. at 678. Although the state bar had admitted the student prior
to his last semester, and the student had engaged in law-related employment while a stu-
dent, the Tax Court disallowed the deduction. Id. at 679. The court reasoned that the tax-
payer was not in the trade or business of being a lawyer, and that he had incurred his ex-
penses to satisfy minimum educational requirements for employment. Id. See generally
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1967); see also notes 52 & 53 infra.
Similarly, in Orrin Grover, 68 T.C. 598 (1977), the Tax Court denied a deduction to a
Marine officer of "basic lawyer" status who had attended law school while on extended
leave. Id. at 602. The court held that the officer's legal education qualified him for a new
trade or business because his degree would enable him to engage in tasks and activities
substantially different from those of a Marine officer. Id. at 601-02. The Grover court con-
trasted the tasks and activities that the taxpayer was qualified to perform before he com-
pleted his legal education with those he was qualified to perform after he completed his
legal education. Since the tasks and activities differed substantially, the court held that the
costs were nondeductible personal expenses within the meaning of § 262. Id. at 602. In Joel
A. Sharon, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), the Tax Court held that costs of legal education constitute an
"inseparable aggregate" of personal and capital expenditures within the meaning of Regula-
tion 1.162-5(b). Id. at 526; see note 46 supra. Consequently, the Sharon court denied the tax-
payer's effort to amortize the expenses. 66 T.C. at 526.
Summer employment, or part-time employment during the school year, does not qual-
ify the student to deduct educational costs under § 162 because the student taxpayer still is
preparing for a new trade or business. The taxpayer, therefore, cannot satisfy the carrying
on requirement of § 162(a). See I.R.C. § 162(a).
See, e.g., Stephen G. Sherman, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1191, 1193 (1977); Albert C.
Ruehmann, III, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 675, 680 (1971); see notes 51-53 infra.
"' In Johnson v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 906 (E.D. La. 1971), the court denied a
deduction for LL.M. expenses because the taxpayer had never actively engaged in the prac-
tice of law. Id. at 908-09. The court held that professional status alone did not amount to the
carrying on of a trade or business. Id at 908. In Stephen G. Sherman, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1191
(1977), the court approved the deduction of $6,800 in tuition for a two-year M.B.A. program,
reasoning that the taxpayer was carrying on the business of being a business manager. Id.
at 1193. The taxpayer in Sherman had been involved in business administration both before
and after his graduate study. Id. In Robert John Picknally, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1292 (1977), the
taxpayer pursued a Ph.D. program during a nine-year period of unemployment. Id. at 1294.
The court allowed a deduction for the educational expenses on the grounds that the tax-
payer previously had been engaged in a trade or business and intended to return to that
same trade or business. Id
Nevertheless, active engagement in a trade or business may be insufficient. In Barry
Reisine, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 1429 (1970), the taxpayer worked for almost a year as an engineer
before resigning to pursue graduate study in engineering. Id at 1429. The court held that
the taxpayer was not sufficiently established in a trade or business and, therefore, could not
deduct his educational expenses. Id. at 1430. See generally Pusker, Education Expenses
Now Easier to Deduct Due to Wider View of Trade or Business,' 21 TAX. ACCOUNTANTS
180 (1978).
1 See note 51 supra; note 53 infra. In Albert C. Ruehmann, III, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 675
(1971), the taxpayer entered an LL.M. program in the fall semester subsequent to his
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satisfy this requirement by demonstrating that he joined the bar and
worked during the summer after law school graduation.'
Bar Review and Other Costs
Under most circumstances, the costs of bar review courses are not
deductible because the taxpayer incurs these expenses to qualify for a
new trade or business.' Bar review costs, like law school tuition, ordi-
narily are personal expenses, which section 262 precludes as a deduc-
tion."5 Bar exam fees and expenses incurred to gain admission to practice
before particular courts also are not deductible under section 162
because they are capital expenditures."8 Although these capital expendi-
tures are not deductible, the taxpayer may amortize them."
graduation from law school. Id. at 677. The taxpayer worked as an attorney in a law firm'
during the intervening summer months. Id The court allowed the deduction, reasoning that
the taxpayer's membership in the bar and his summer employment established him in the
trade or business of practicing law. Id at 680. Ruehmann indicates that the graduate law
student must show that he was employed at least briefly as a practicing attorney in order to
deduct his educational costs.
' The Ruehmann court, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 675 (1971), based its decision on all the facts
in the record. The court noted that the graduate student had been offered permanent
employment whether or not he obtained an LL.M. degree. Id at 677, 680. Nevertheless, the
court emphasized the taxpayer's bar membership prior to the start of his summer work and
that the taxpayer did the same work during the summer as other lawyers in the firm with
his experience. Id. at 680. If the firm's offer of permanent employment had been contingent
on the taxpayer's completion of the LL.M. requirements, the LL.M. expenses would not
have been deductible. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b)(2) (1967).
See Joel A. Sharon, 66 T.C. 515, 526, 529-30 (1976); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1967).
Joel A. Sharon, 66 T.C. 515, 526 (1976). In Sharon, Judge Irwin made a persuasive
argument in dissent. Judge Irwin argued that once an individual has qualified to practice
law in one state, a bar review course for another state does not lead to his qualification for a
new trade or business. Id. at 537 (Irwin, J., dissenting); cf. Rev. Rul. 58, 1971-1 C.B. 55, 56
(teacher becoming certified in another state not qualifying for new trade or business).
" See Avery v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 105, 108 (N.D. Iowa 1976); Joel A. Sharon,
66 T.C. 515, 526, 531 (1976). A taxpayer may not deduct capital expenditures. I.R.C. § 263.
Expenditures are capital in nature when the benefits extend over a relatively long period of
time. One test for determining the capital nature of expenditures is the "accrual of benefits"
test. See Avery v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 105, 108 (NJ). Iowa 1976). Usually, an expen-
diture is capital in nature when its benefits extend beyond one year. Id.
" In Joel A. Sharon, 66 T.C. 515 (1976), the Tax Court noted that the taxpayer's
licenses to practice law in particular states and before specific courts were intangible
assets. See id. at 531. Furthermore, the court determined that these assets amounted to
property used in the taxpayer's trade or business within the meaning of § 167. See i&e at
531-32. Section 167 provides for a depreciation deduction for the exhaustion, wear and tear
of property used in a trade or business. I.R.C. § 167(a)(1). As a result, the Tax Court allowed
the taxpayer to amortize his bar exam fees and court admission costs. 66 T.C. at 532. The
court, however, required the taxpayer to amortize these capital expenditures over his life
expectancy because he had failed to convince the court that the useful life of his licenses
would terminate when he reached the age of 65. Id. at 530. In the interest of idministrative
convenience, the Sharon court indicated that although the taxpayer's $25 New York bar ex-
am fee was a capital expenditure, such a small fee ordinarily could be deducted. Id. at 527.
1981]
100 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVIII
By compayison, an established attorney's educational costs frequently
are deductible. In Coughlin v. Commissioner,8 the Second Circuit held
that an attorney's tuition, travel, meals, and lodging expenses, incurred
while attending a special institute on taxation, constituted ordinary and
necessary trade or business expenses. 9 The court based its decision on
Regulations relating to analogous expenses for professional society
dues, subscriptions to professional journals, and books of short useful
life." The Second Circuit also emphasized the taxpayer's need to keep
abreast of current developments in his area of expertise." As a general
rule, once an individual establishes that he is carrying on the trade or
business of practicing law, virtually all of his business related educa-
tional costs are deductible. If the individual is a sole practitioner or a
partner, rather than an employee, he may deduct these expenses above
the line.62
SCHOLARSHIPS, GRANTS, LOANS
Many law students depend on scholarships or fellowship grants. Sec-
tion 117 provides that an individual's gross income does not include
scholarships or fellowship grants. The exclusion does not apply, how-
203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir. 1953).
Id. at 308-10.
/dI\at 309; see Treas. Reg. § 1.162-6 (1960). Professional expenses for items with
short useful lives are deductible under the general language of § 162(a). See I.R.C. § 162(a);
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-6 (1960). In Coughlin, the court determined that the taxpayer's expenses
in attending the tax institute were too short-term and ill-defined in nature to be capital ex-
penditures. See 203 F.2d at 309-10. See generally Barr, supra note 47, at 156-57; Treas. Reg.
§ 162-5(b)(3)(ii), (e)(1) (1967). Section 212(3) allows a deduction for all ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax.
I.R.C. § 212(3). Although the costs of law school tax books might appear to be deductible
under § 212(3), instead of § 162(a), the courts' restrictive interpretation of the provision and
the requirement of ordinariness make deductibility unlikely. See generally Treas. Reg. §
1.212-1(f) (1975); Vogel & Halperin, Has Dentist Merians Pulled the Teeth From Section
2120(3?, 27 TAX. LAW. 435 (1974).
'" 203 F.2d at 309. In Coughlin, the taxpayer was a member of a law firm that required
at least one member to be especially knowledgeable on federal taxation. The court noted
that the Coughlin circumstances differed from those in Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906
(4th Cir. 1950), only in that Coughlin involved a lesser degree of necessity. 203 F.2d at 309.
In Hill, a teacher incurred summer school expenses in order to satisfy certification require-
ments. See note 38 supra.
' See I.R.C. § 62(1), (2); text accompanying notes 15-20 supra. Section 62(1) allows
deductions above the line for § 162(a) expenses if the taxpayer's trade or business does not
consist of being an employee. See I.R.C. § 62(1); Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(c)(1) (1976). In addition,
to be deductible under § 62(1), an expense must be "directly ... connected with the conduct
of a trade or business." Treas. Reg. § 1.62-1(d) (1976). A taxpayer who is an employee, how-
ever, must deduct his educational costs below the line. See I.R.C. § 62(2). See also [19801 2
STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1360.01.
' I.R.C. § 117. Section 61 states that gross income includes all income from whatever
source derived, except as otherwise provided. Id. § 61. The Code specifically provides for
the exclusion of some items from gross income. See id. §§ 101-128. The practical difference
between a deduction and an exclusion is that the taxpayer does not report an exclusion. See
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ever, to any portion received as compensation for services," unless all
candidates for a particular degree must render such services.65
Most student teaching assistants are not involved in programs that
require teaching services of all degree candidates. Section 117's effect,
therefore, is unclear in the case of teaching assistants who receive pay-
ments that are designed to compensate for services as well as to aid in
the pursuit of studies." - The Internal Revenue Service has adopted a
&&primary purpose" approach. 7 The Service maintains that payments are
excludible from gross income only if the primary purpose of the pay-
ments is to further the education and training of the recipient. 8 If the
primary purpose of the payments is to further the grantor's interest, the
student must include the payments in his gross income."9 In Hembree v.
United States," the Fourth Circuit took a different approach. The court
held that funds that are in substantial measure a quid pro quo for ser-
vices do not qualify for exclusion under section 117.71 Nevertheless,
under either the primary purpose test or the quid pro quo test, third-
year law student assistantships are more like compensation than
scholarships.7 2 Consequently, section 117 does not exclude third-year
assistantship funds from gross income.
Commissioner v. Mendel, 351 F.2d 580, 582-83 (4th Cir. 1965). The Code limits the exclusion
for scholarships to those scholarships received at typical educational institutions satisfying
the broad requirements of § 170(b}(1}(A)(ii). All accredited law schools apparently would
satisfy the criteria. See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(b) (1960).
I.R.C. § 117(b)(1). Non-degree candidates are subject to other specified conditions for
and limitations upon the exclusion of scholarships. See id. § 117(b)(2). A non-degree candi-
date may exclude only those scholarships from particular grantors and only within specified
time and amount limitations. See id
Id. § 117(b)(1).
See generally Randall, Teaching Assistants and Taxes-Paid to Study, or Paid to
Work?, 8 GONZ. L. REV. 33, 33-34 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Randall]. At least two commen-
tators have recommended that Congress clarify § 117. See Myers & Hopkins, IRS Is
Limiting the Scope of Exclusion for Fellowship and Scholarship Grants, 42 J. TAX. 212,
212-213, 215 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Myers & Hopkins]. See generally Bingler v.
Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
17 See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1960); Myers & Hopkins, supra note 66, at 214-15. The
Internal Revenue Service interprets § 117 restrictively. See Myers & Hopkins, supra note
66, at 213, 215.
See Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1960); Myers & Hopkins, supra note 66, at 214-16; Ran-
dall, supra note 66, at 38.
&9 See Steven M. Weinberg, 64 T.C. 771, 776-77 (1975); Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1960);
Myers & Hopkins, supra note 66, at 214-15.
71 464 F.2d 1262 (4th Cir. 1972).
7, Id. at 1265; see Randall, supra note 66, at 36. See also Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S.
741, 751 (1969).
n At least one commentator has suggested that the Hembree decision, see text accom-
panying notes 70 & 71 supra, creates increased uncertainties for teaching assistants in
determining whether they may exclude their funds from gross income. See Randall, supra
note 66, at 38. Discussions regarding the excludibility of teaching assistantship grants often
revolve around whether the funds are designed to attract qualified students or to compen-
sate for services. See generally Logan v. United States, 518 F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1975); Robert
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Unconditional grants of financial aid are excludible from gross in-
come.73 Funds received pursuant to loan agreements also do not consti-
tute gross income.74 Furthermore, interest payments on educational
loans are deductible. 5 The Service takes the position, however, that a
loan cancellation, or a loan forgiveness conditioned on the student bor-




Summer law clerks incur many expenses at locations that are
wonderfully distant from law school. Section 162, however, may ease the
financial burden of travel costs and additional living expenses.77 In the
recent case of Soterios Hantzis,78 the Tax Court allowed a law student to
deduct $3,204 in expenses incurred during the summer after her second
year.79
Section 162(a)(2) provides that traveling costs incurred while away
from home in the pursuit of a trade or business are deductible as ordi-
nary and necessary trade or business expenses. Traveling expenses in-
clude transportation, meals, and lodging. 1 To deduct his traveling ex-
H. Steiman, 56 T.C. 1350 (1971); Treas. Reg. § 1.117-4(c) (1960); Myers & Hopkins, supra note
66; Randall, supra note 66, at 36. Third-year assistantships are not essential to inducing
third-year students to continue their legal education at a particular institution. While the
possibility of receiving an assistantship only remotely serves to attract students to the
school initially, the grantor institution derives considerable benefit from awarding such
funds.
See I.R.C. § 117(a), (b)(1).
7, See William H. Stayton, Jr., 32 B.T.A. 940, 943 (1935); Lorenzo C. Dilks, 15 B.T.A.
1294, 1300-01 (1929).
" Section 163 allows a deduction for all interest on loans paid within the taxable year.
I.R.C. § 163(a). Interest deductions are below-the-line deductions and, therefore, are
valuable only if the total itemized deductions exceed the zero bracket amount. See id. § 62;
text accompanying notes 16-18 supra.
" See Rev. Rul. 256, 1973-1 C.B. 56, 56, modified, Rev. Rul. 540, 1974-2 C.B. 38; Myers
& Hopkins, supra note 66, at 215-16. See generally Note, Taxation-Scholarship and
Fellowship Exclusion-Forgiveness of Educational Loans, 1974 WIs. L. REv. 237.
*After this article went to press, the First Circuit reversed the Tax Court's decision in
Soterios Hantzis, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169 (1979), rev'd, No. 80-1140 (1st Cir. Jan. 7, 1981). See
text accompanying notes 78-105 infra. The First Circuit denied the taxpayer's deduction,
holding that her expenses were not incurred while away from home. No. 80-1140, slip op. at
13. The court of appeals reasoned that since the taxpayer had no business connection with
her school location, she could not claim the situs of her school as her home for § 162(a)(2) pur-
poses. See id at 15-16. Nevertheless, the Tax Court is free to follow its decision in Hantzis
in cases not appealable to the First Circuit. See Jack E. Golsen, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970),
affd, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 940 (1971).
" See I.R.C. § 162(a); text accompanying notes 39-41 supra.
"' 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169 (1979).
Id. at 1171.
I.R.C. § 162(a)(2).
" Id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (1960). Amounts expended for meals and lodging that are
lavish or extravagant under the circumstances are not deductible. I.R.C. § 162(a)(2).
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penses under section 162(a)(2), a taxpayer normally must satisfy three
conditions.82 First, the expense must be a reasonable and necessary
traveling expense." Second, the taxpayer must incur the expense while
away from homey Third, the expense must be directly connected with
the carrying on of the taxpayer's trade or business. 5
The second and third conditions are subject to an exception when the
job is temporary in nature. The Internal Revenue Service ordinarily
defines home as the taxpayer's principal or regular place of business.86
The courts, however, have not accepted the Service's definition when
the taxpayer's job is only temporary. When the taxpayer's job is tem-
porary and at a location other than his permanent residence, the courts
have defined home as the taxpayer's permanent residence." A tempo-
rary job, therefore, can satisfy the away from home requirement not-
withstanding the Service's definition of home. Furthermore, when the
employment is temporary, the taxpayer need not establish a direct con-
nection between the expense and the carrying on of the trade or busi-
ness. The taxpayer must show only that to expect him to move his home
would be unreasonable.89 If the taxpayer can show that a move would be
Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946). The Supreme Court decided the
Flowers case under § 23(a)(1)(A) of the 1939 Code, the forerunner of § 162(a)(2). See 326 U.S.
at 467; Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 23(a)(1)(A), 53 Stat. 12 (current version at I.R.C. §
162(a)(2)).
Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946).
Id.
Id. A taxpayer's performance of services as an employee constitutes his trade or
business. See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(d) (1960); Rev. Rul. 189, 1960-1 C.B. 60, 65; [1980] 2 STAND.
FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1342.01.
" See Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1971); [1980] 2 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. (CCH) 1352.01. But see Rev. Rul. 432, 1975-2 C.B. 60, 61 (taxpayer's place of abode
regarded as tax home when he has no principal place of business); Rev. Rul. 189, 1960-1 C.B.
60, 62-64 (exception to I.R.S. concept of home when employment is temporary). The Tax
Court normally accepts the Internal Revenue Service's definition of home as the taxpayer's
principal or regular place of business. See Emil J. Michaels, 53 T.C. 269, 273 (1969). But see
text accompanying note 87 infra.
8 See Soterios Hantzis, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169, 1171 (1979); Emil J. Michaels, 53 T.C.
269, 273 (1969); Harry F. Schurer, 3 T.C. 544, 546-47 (1944). See also Six v. United States, 450
F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1971); Laurence P. Dowd, 37 T.C. 399, 409-10 (1961); Rev. Rul. 189, 1960-1
C.B. 60, 62-64; note 88 infra.
" See Soterios Hantzis, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 1169, 1171 (1979); Emil J. Michaels, 53 T.C.
269, 274 (1969); Harry F. Schurer, 3 T.C. 544, 546-47 (1944). The Second Circuit has rejected
the Service's definition of home as the principal place of business. According to the Second
Circuit, home means a taxpayer's permanent abode or residence. See Six v. United States,
450 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1971); Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 908-10 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 864 (1971). If the taxpayer's employment is indefinite in nature, however,
the Second Circuit will consider the taxpayer's place of employment as his permanent resi-
dence. See 450 F.2d at 69. One commentator has suggested that the Second Circuit's view is
preferable because treating the taxpayer's abode as his home eliminates the need for
strained exceptions to the away from home rule. See Comment, Travel, Transportation, and
Commuting Expenses: Problems Involving Deductibility, 43 Mo. L. REv. 525, 543-44 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Travel].
" See Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66, 69 & n.1, 70 (2d Cir. 1971); Rosenspan v.
United States, 438 F.2d 905, 911-12 (2d Cir. 1971).
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unreasonable, his living expenses satisfy the third condition of section
162(a)(2) because they are deemed compelled by business exigencies."
In the Hantzis case, a Harvard law student resided in Boston with
her husband. During the summer after her second year, the student
clerked for a law firm in New York City. She rented an apartment in
New York and worked for ten weeks. During the course of the summer,
the student spent $3,204 for traveling expenses, $3,080 of which was at-
tributable to meals and lodging.9 Noting that the taxpayer's stay in New
York was temporary," the Tax Court held that her summer expenses
were deductible under section 162(a)(2). 3
The Hantzis court properly rejected the government's arguments
that the taxpayer failed to satisfy the away from home requirement and
that she did not incur the expenses in the pursuit of a trade or business. 4
The court reasoned that since the taxpayer's time in New York was not
indefinite in duration99 and the taxpayer had a bona fide home in Boston,
the I.R.S. could not have reasonably expected her to move her perma-
nent residence to New York.9" The court also emphasized that section
162(a)(2) was intended to afford relief for the duplication of living ex-
penses incurred by the student.97 Furthermore, the taxpayer incurred
her expenses in the pursuit of a trade or business because her employ-
ment necessitated the expenses. 8
The Hantzis case demonstrates that a law student must fulfill two re-
quirements in order to deduct his summer clerking expenses.9 First, his
employment must be temporary, rather than indefinite.0 Virtually all
I See Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905, 912 (2d Cir. 1971); text accompanying
note 85 supra.
"' 38 T.C.M. at 1170. Transportation between Boston and New York accounted for $124
of the student's expenses in Hantzis. Id
9 Id at 1171.
Id
Id.
's Id See generally Ronald D. Kroll, 49 T.C. 557 (1968).
38 T.C.M. at 1171. See Six v. United States, 450 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1971); Harvey v.
Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491 (9th Cir. 1960); Ronald D. Kroll, 49 T.C. 557, 562 (1968). The
Hantzis court also reasoned that the taxpayer had a home to be away from, and that long
distance commutation for personal reasons was not involved. 38 T.C.M. at 1171. In Flowers,
the Supreme Court established the principle that expenses resulting from personal prefer-
ence are not deductible. Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473-74 (1946).
9 38 T.C.M. at 1171; see James v. United States, 308 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1962); Lee
E. Daly, 72 T.C. 190, 195 (1979); Charles W. Rambo, 69 T.C. 920, 924 (1978). See also note 102
infra. The Hantzis court noted additionally that the taxpayer had minimal contacts with
New York City. 38 T.C.M. at 1171. See also Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473
(1946); Travel, supra note 88, at 547.
38 T.C.M. at 1171.
See id. Regardless of the unique conditions that the taxpayer must satisfy for the
deduction of specific expenses, all expenses must be reasonable and necessary in order to be
deductible under § 162(a)(2). Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946); see note 82
supra.
" See T.C.M. at 1171; text accompanying notes 86-88 supra.
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summer jobs, by their very nature, satisfy this criterion. Second, the stu-
dent must maintain a permanent residence in some location other than
his place of summer employment."' Although the Hantzis decision does
not expressly identify what constitutes maintaining a permanent resi-
dence, the opinion indicates that some showing of duplication of living
expenses may be necessary.1 2 As a result, a law student probably cannot
satisfy the away from home requirement of section 162(a)(2) by claiming
his parents' home as his permanent residence."3 The typical law student,
therefore, must establish the location of his law school as his permanent
residence, the maintenance of which results in duplicative living ex-
penses during the summer.1 ' The section 162(a)(2) deduction is an above-
the-line deduction. 5 Consequently, the student may deduct his summer
expenses whether or not he itemizes his deductions.
JOB-SEEKING EXPENSES
A law student may be able to deduct expenses related to job-seeking
under section 162.1"' Section 162 requires that the taxpayer incur the ex-
"' See 38 T.C.M. at 1171; text accompanying note 96 supra. The taxpayer must have a
home to be away from. See generally Brandl v. Commissioner, 513 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1975);
Rosenspan v. United States, 438 F.2d 905 (2d Cir. 1971); Charles W. Rambo, 69 T.C. 920
(1978); Andrzej T. Wirth, 61 T.C. 855 (1974).
0 See 38 T.C.M. at 1171; J. B. Stewart, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1316, 1318-19 (1971), aff'd per
curiam, 77-2 U.S.T.C. 9617 (10th Cir. 1972); Emil J. Michaels, 53 T.C. 269, 273-75 (1969);
Laurence P. Dowd, 37 T.C. 399, 410 (1961). In Hantzis, the court noted that the taxpayer had
incurred expenses which to some extent duplicated other living expenses. 38 T.C.M. at
1171. An absence of duplicated living expenses, however, may not preclude a student from
deducting his summer expenses. See Emil J. Michaels, 53 T.C. 269, 275 (1969). In Michaels,
the court emphasized the temporary nature of the taxpayer's employment, the retention of
his house in the city from which he traveled, and the short period for which that house was
rented. Id. In Charles W. Rambo, 69 T.C. 920 (1978), the court acknowledged that all ex-
penses for meals and lodging, not just the expenses that duplicate, are deductible when §
162(a)(2) requirements are fulfilled. Id- at 924.
"I In Andrzej T. Wirth, 61 T.C. 855 (1974), the court held that a taxpayer has a home
for § 162(a)(2) purposes only "when he has incurred substantial living expenses at a perma-
nent place of abode." Id at 859; see Jerome M. Rosenblum, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 495, 496-97
(1970); notes 101 & 102 supra.
I0 See generally Luke J. Monroe, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 466 (1979); Berton N. Cross, 38
T.C.M. (CCH) 234 (1979). Evidence that the location of a law student's school is his perma-
nent residence might include voter registration, driver's license, payment of property taxes,
and home ownership or ongoing lease arrangements. If the law student cannot establish a
permanent residence at his school location, arguably his round-trip transportation costs be-
tween his summer job location and his school are deductible above the line. See §§ 62(2)(c),
162(a).
-- I.R.C. § 62(2)(B). If a taxpayer claims a deduction for summer expenses under §
162(a)(2), no deduction for moving expenses is allowable under § 217. The temporary job ex-
ception to the away from home requirement of § 162(a)(2) presupposes that the taxpayer has
not moved his permanent residence in order to begin work at a new principal place of
employment. See Treas. Reg. § 1.217-2(c)(3)(iii) (1979); text accompanying notes 86-90 supra.
" See, e.g., Cecil R. Hundley, Jr., 48 T.C. 339 (1967); Rev. Rul. 120, 1975-1 C.B. 55.
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penses in carrying on a trade or business."°7 Because of the time-consum-
ing nature of law school and the lengthy intervals of unemployment,
most law students are unable to establish that they are carrying on the
business of being a law clerk. Without a law degree or admission to the
bar, law students obviously cannot show that they are engaged in the
business of practicing law."' As a result, law students seeking a J.D.
degree may not deduct expenses incurred during their search for either
summer or permanent employment.
The job-seeking expenses of a law student's spouse, however, may be
deductible. If a spouse is engaged in a trade or business prior to the
move to law school, the expenses he or she incurs to attain a position in
that same trade or business after the move may be deductible.' Ex-
penses incurred in seeking a position in a new trade or business are not
deductible."' Job-seeking expenses also are not deductible when the
spouse has not been employed previously"' or returns to work after a
long period of unemployment."2 Nevertheless, if the spouse's payment of
job-seeking expenses is contingent on and not payable until after secur-
ing employment, the spouse may deduct the expenses."' Otherwise, suc-
cess in the job-seeking endeavor is irrelevant to deductibility."'
INCOME AVERAGING
The income of most law students varies markedly from year to year
during the period between college graduation and the early years of
employment as an attorney. For some students, both single and married,
the income averaging provisions of sections 1301 to 1305 may allow a
substantial reduction in tax liability."' Income averaging reduces the
'o I.R.C. § 162(a).
100 See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra. But see text accompanying notes 51-53
supra.
1" See Rev. Rul. 120, 1975-1 C.B. 55, 56. The length of time for which the spouse has
been unemployed is important in the determination of whether he or she is carrying on a
trade or business. See i&L A spouse's success in procuring employment in his or her trade or
business is irrelevant to the deductibility of expenses incurred in the effort. See Leonard F.
Cremona, 58 T.C. 219, 221-22 (1972), acq., 1975-1 C.B. 1. Therefore, the expenses of a spouse
who obtains a job in a new trade or business while seeking a job in his or her old trade or
business arguably are deductible. Whether a spouse is carrying on the same trade or busi-
ness often will depend on the breadth of the characterization of his or her trade or business.
See York v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 421, 422 (4th Cir. 1958).
... Rev. Rul. 120, 1975-1 C.B. 55, 56.
I Id.
Il' See id.
..3 See Cecil R. Hundley, Jr., 48 T.C. 339, 350 (1967).
.1. Leonard F. Cremona, 58 T.C. 219, 222 (1972); see Rev. Rul. 120, 1975-1 C.B. 55, 56.
Job-seeking expenses for transportation and travel that satisfy § 162(a)(2) requirements are
above-the-line deductions, deductible from gross income. See I.R.C. § 62(2); Rev. Rul. 16,
1977-1 C.B. 37, 38. In most cases, expenses for resumes, typing, and postage are below-the-
line deductions, which are valuable only if the taxpayer itemizes his deductions. See Rev.
Rul. 16, 1977-1 C.B. 37, 38; [1980] 2 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1342.03.
"' See I.R.C. §§ 1301-1305.
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taxes otherwise payable for those years when income increases drama-
tically."" The taxes normally due in the current tax year are reduced ac-
cording to a formula that refers to the lower annual income amounts for
the four-year period prior to the current tax year."'
To qualify for income averaging, an eligible individual's"8 averagable
income must exceed $3,000."' Averagable income is the amount by which
taxable income for the current tax year exceeds 1200/o of the average in-
come for the previous four years.2 ' That amount which equals 120% of
the average income for the prior four years is taxed according to the tax
tables of section 1.121 The excess, averagable income, is taxed according
to a three-step formula."= First, 20/o of the taxpayer's averagable in-
come is added to 1200/o of the taxpayer's average income for the pre-
vious four years.' The tax that ordinarily would be due on this sum is
then calculated from the tax tables.'24 Second, the tax that ordinarily
would be due on 120/0 of the average income for the prior four years is
subtracted from the tax amount derived in the first step. 2' Third, the
difference is multiplied by five to arrive at the tax attributable to
averagable income.'26 The taxpayer's total tax is the tax on 120% of the
average income for the prior four years plus the tax attributable to
averagable income."
... See id. See generally Berger, Income Averaging Benefits Not Limited to a Tax-
payer With One Exceptional Year, 21 TAX. ACCOUNTANTS 214 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Berger].
... See I.R.C. §§ 1301-1302.
"' See text accompanying notes 128-32 infra.
" See I.R.C. § 1301. One commentator has suggested a three-step shortcut for deter-
mining whether income averaging may be helpful. First, total the taxable income for the
four years prior to the current tax year and, pursuant to § 1302(b)(3), add a zero bracket
amount adjustment for years prior to 1977. Second, multiply that total by 3 0%. Third, add
$3,000. If the taxable income for the computation year is greater than the figure arrived at
through the above computations, income averaging may reduce the taxpayer's tax liability.
See Berger, supra note 116, at 215.
" I.R.C. § 1302(a)(1). If any of the previous four years is prior to 1977, the taxpayer
must increase the taxable income for that prior year by the appropriate zero bracket
amount. Id. § 1302(b)(3).
121 See id. §§ 1, 1301; note 120 supra.
" See I.R.C. § 1301. Section 1301 provides that the tax attributable to averagable in-
come shall be five times the increase in tax that would result under § 1 from adding 20% of
the taxpayer's averagable income to 120% of the taxpayer's average income for the
previous four years. See id.
" See id.; note 120 supra.
"' See I.R.C. § 1301.
" See id.; note 120 supra.
See I.R.C. § 1301.
" See id.; note 120 supra. As an example of income averaging, assume that T, a mar-
ried individual filing a joint return, has taxable income for the current year of $30,000 and
average income for the previous four years of $10,000. T's averagable income is $30,000 less
120% of $10,000, or $18,000. According to the tax tables, the tax on $12,000 (120% of
$10,000) is $1,425. The remaining $18,000, T's averagable income, is taxed according to §
1301. First, § 1301 requires that 200/0 of $18,000, or $3,600, be added to 120% of $10,000, or
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To be eligible for income averaging, an individual must have fur-
nished not less than one-half of his own support for each of the four
years preceding the current tax year." Many law students, therefore,
are not eligible for income averaging because their parents have sup-
ported them for at least one of the previous four years. The support re-
quirement does not apply, however, in three situations." First, the sup-
port requirement is inapplicable if the taxpayer is at least twenty-five
years old and for at least four years since reaching the age of twenty-one
has not been a full-time student.13 Second, if more than one-half of the in-
dividual's taxable income for the current tax year is attributable to work
substantially performed during two or more of the previous four years,
the support requirement is waived.'31 Third, the support requirement
does not apply if the taxpayer files a joint return and no more than one-
fourth of the couple's total adjusted gross income is attributable to that
taxpayer.'32
Sections 1302, 1303, and 1304 include other provisions covering
special circumstances, such as changes in marital status.'33 These provi-
sions are covered adequately in Schedule G, which the taxpayer attaches
to his income tax return, Form 1040.1'4 For those law students who qual-
ify in a given year, income averaging can produce large tax savings.'35
Even if a student taxpayer does not qualify in his first year as an attor-
ney, income averaging may be beneficial in future years.'
$12,000. The sum is $15,600. The tax normally due on $15,600 is $2,181. Second, $1,425 is
subtracted from $2,181. The difference, $756, is multiplied by five. The product, $3,780, is
the tax attributable to averagable income. T's total tax for the current year is therefore the
sum of $1,425 and $3,780, or $5,205. Without income averaging, T's tax would be $6,238, an
increase of $1,033.
" Id. § 1303(c)(1). Cf. Richard Sharvy, 67 T.C. 630 (1977), aff'd, 566 F.2d 1118 (9th Cir.
1977) (fellowship not support furnished by taxpayer). See also Rev. Rul. 40, 1975-1 C.B. 276.
" Id. § 1303(c)(2); see Berger, supra note 116, at 218.
"3 I.R.C. § 1303(c)(2)(A). The age exception for income averaging will be of little benefit
to most law students because most law students have not been out of college for at least
four years.
' Id. § 1303(c)(2(B). See generally Smith, How to Become Miss America Without
Achieving Any "Major Accomplishment"--Some Thoughts on the Income Averaging Pro-
visions of the Internal Revenue Code, 54 MARQ. L. REV. 329 (1971).
"3 I.R.C. § 1303(c)(2)(C). To use income averaging on a joint return, both spouses must
be eligible individuals. Treas. Reg. § 1.1303-1(a) (1972); see text accompanying notes 128-31
supra. If only one spouse is eligible for income averaging, however, the filing of separate
returns, with the eligible spouse averaging his or her income, may produce substantial tax
benefits. See Berger, supra note 116, at 219.
" See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1304(c)(1), (2). See generally Berger, supra note 116.
" See Berger, supra note 116, at 214.
' See id. at 220.
'8 The taxpayer should consider income averaging each year because he may elect to
average his income each year. See Goldberg & Litwin, Choosing Between the Tax Benefits




Careful analysis of the Internal Revenue Code sections'37 and their
judicial interpretation reveals legitimate ways to reduce one's taxable
income.'38 Even Justice Cardozo could not object to this approach.'39
ALAN L. BUTTON
'3 See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 62, 117, 162, 217, 1301.
' Above-the-line deductions are especially valuable because they serve to reduce tax-
able income without being contingent on a threshold level of itemized deductions. See text
accompanying notes 15-20 supra.
'" See text accompanying notes 1-4 supra. The taxpayer should collect receipts and
maintain records of his deductible expenses. Treasury Regulation § 1.162-17 (1962) provides
guidance for the taxpayer on keeping adequate records and on substantiating expenses in
the absence of proper records.
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